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The Invention of Agriculture

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Tuesday, November 19, 2024

Subscribe here: Apple Podcasts | Spotify | YouTube | Overcast | Pocket CastsAfter 200,000 years of hunting and gathering, a history-defining decision was made. Starting roughly 12,000 years ago, at least seven different groups of humans independently began to settle down and begin farming. In so doing, they planted the seeds for modern civilization. This is traditionally told as a straightforward story of human progress. After humans made the switch, population growth increased, spurring innovative and creative endeavors that our ancestors couldn’t even imagine.One counterintuitive strain of thought has treated this decision as “the worst mistake in the history of the human race,” as the popular author Jared Diamond once put it. The argument largely rests on research that shows our nomadic forebears were healthier and had more leisure time than those who chose to farm. Diamond, who wrote this article in 1987, when overpopulation concerns were rampant within the American environmental movement, argued that, “forced to choose between limiting population or trying to increase food production, we chose the latter and ended up with starvation, warfare, and tyranny.”Sometimes unorthodox ideas are unorthodox for a reason. On today’s episode of Good on Paper, I’m joined by Andrea Matranga, an economist whose recent paper “The Ant and the Grasshopper: Seasonality and the Invention of Agriculture” argues that the Neolithic revolution happened as a result of climactic changes that necessitated storing food for the winter. Matranga rejects the idea that the past 12,000 years of human development were a mistake, one that underrates the threats of famine and starvation endemic to nomadic life.“There’s a sense in which theories of the Neolithic tend to mirror the political anxieties and the social anxieties of the time in which people came up with them and in which they found favor,” Matranga tells me. “So, you know, obviously in the ’80s—WWF, environmentalism, Earth Day—people are worried about runaway population growth. So obviously in the Neolithic, they must also have had runaway population growth. There’s this interesting mix of the current events bleeding into history.”The following is a transcript of the episode:[Music]Jerusalem Demsas: One of Aesop’s Fables is called “The Ant and the Grasshopper.” As the story goes, a hungry grasshopper comes up to a group of ants in the wintertime and asks them for some food to eat. They are shocked and ask him why he hasn’t stored anything up before the weather got cold. And he replies that he’d eaten well during the summer and made music while the weather was warm. The moral of the story is pretty straightforward: Save while times are good.But for most of human history, for 200,000 years, humanity was much more like the grasshopper than the ants. As hunter-gatherers, we ate well when resources were plentiful but didn’t save for winter, making us susceptible to starvation and death.But then something changed. Around the world, within a relatively short period of time, a bunch of humans independently began farming—and kept farming. How did this happen?[Music]My name’s Jerusalem Demsas. I’m a staff writer here at The Atlantic, and this is Good on Paper. It’s a policy show that questions what we really know about popular narratives.In a paper called “The Ant and the Grasshopper: Seasonality and the Invention of Agriculture,” economist Andrea Matranga formalizes a theory for how humans went from grasshoppers to ants—for how we went from hunting and gathering to settled farming.Climate seasonality increased, meaning winters got harsher and summers got drier. Hunter-gatherers couldn’t keep up with wildlife that fled for warmer climates. Birds can fly south for winters. Humans can’t. So they realized they needed to start storing food during good times. That meant the end of our nomadic lifestyles because people had to remain near those stores.This paper intervenes in the literature in a couple of important ways I explored with Andrea: First, it helps untangle the mystery of how humans became farmers to begin with. But second, it pushes back against the strangely nostalgic idea that our nomadic existence was somehow better than farming—an idea that holds sway among a surprising number of people.Let’s dive in.[Music] Demsas: Andrea, welcome to the show.Andrea Matranga: Thank you so much. Thank you for having me.Demsas: Yeah. So we’re here to talk about a very fun new paper that you’ve recently published at [The Quarterly Journal of Economics], and it’s about the Neolithic Revolution. We’re trying to go all the way back in time. We’ve done some development episodes, but this is further back than I think we’ve ever, ever gone.I want to start with what the Neolithic Revolution was. Can you set the stage for us?Matranga: Yes, absolutely. Neolithic means “new stone,” and it was first detected as a change in the shape of the stone tools that they were using. And then, eventually, they realized that the reason they changed the shape of the tools was also because they changed the subsistence method, meaning that before that—in the Paleolithic, in the Old Stone Age—everybody was a hunter-gatherer, meaning that they were subsisting on foods that grew wild, which they would collect, process, and consume. And then in the Neolithic, or New Stone Age, they started to grow their own food. So the origins of agriculture is what distinguishes the paleo from the Neolithic.Demsas: And around how long ago are we talking?Matranga: It was about 11,500 years ago in the Middle East. And there were seven of these places, and the two latest ones were in sub-Saharan Africa and in eastern North America, where it was about 4,500 years ago.Demsas: You’ve just laid out the span of a few thousand years here where, in a bunch of different places across the world, people are independently inventing farming and agriculture. You said in sub-Saharan Africa but also in the Middle East, north and south China, the Andes, Mexico, North America. How do we know that these developments were independent? And what sorts of evidence do we have from archaeology or otherwise that signal when farming began?Matranga: Yeah, absolutely. For some, it’s very easy. Obviously, if you look at eastern North America versus sub-Saharan Africa, these are two populations which had not had any cultural mixture, so clearly those two have to be independent.When you go from, let’s say, south China and north China or the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, then it becomes a little bit murkier. Usually, the arguments that are made are that there’s no other signs of cultural contact, in the sense that the pottery styles are different; the crops that are being grown are different. Usually, you would expect that if they start doing barley and emmer wheat in the Middle East—if you thought that farmers had arrived with this knowledge of it into the Sahel region of Africa, you’d expect them to try to do some of those crops first, and then maybe they find some other crops that work better. And instead, it’s sort of completely disjoint. And that’s usually the way that they think about it.Now, could it be that the idea that somebody was farming some distance away made their way through it? It’s possible, though one of the things is that there’s so many populations today, or in the recent past, that when they were contacted, they had knowledge of plant biology. So they understood perfectly well that if you plant a seed, a plant would grow. But they still hadn’t started farming. They were still hunting and gatherers. And so just knowing that it’s possible to do it doesn’t mean that you have a coherent sort of structure and a strategy for doing it as a population. So for example, I know that if you plant a seed, something grows, but that doesn’t mean I could sustain myself as a farmer.Demsas: (Laughs.) Yes.Matranga: So it still seems that, at least in the sort of making all the parts fit together, these things definitely happened independently in these places.Demsas: But for most of human history, we’re talking about—I mean, 12,000 years ago is obviously a long time ago—but we’re talking about hundreds of thousands of years before then, where we’re a hunter-gathering and are nomads. And so this question of why we make this switch as a species is really, really interesting.And before we get into your research, I’m hoping that we can talk through how the field was thinking about the advent of the Neolithic Revolution. And what were some of the prevailing theories about why agriculture emerged after the last Ice Age?Matranga: Absolutely. So one of the things that happened was that, obviously, we didn’t have as many excavations done, let’s say, in 1900 as we have today. And we didn’t have as good, for example, DNA—we didn’t have DNA at all—but DNA sequencing and other stuff like that. We have much more tools. So obviously, then the theories have also kept pace with the new information that was uncovered.If you look at the earliest theories—Darwin talks about this a little bit but also, let’s say, Braidwood—there are mainly theories about the Middle East because that one was the one where people knew that there had been a Neolithic transition. It was the first one to be excavated. And so most of the explanations are particular to the Middle East. And so one of the arguments that was made was that there might have been a climate desiccation, so it became drier around those years. And when it became drier, people were forced into these oases where there was still water. Therefore, once they were sort of constrained to these small areas, then it was easier to start farming and also necessary because there was just much less land that was fertile enough for hunting and gathering. And so you start taking better care about the land that you already have.And then as you go forward, then one of the things that appeared in the 1960s was the fact that, actually, very often the hunter-gatherers seemed to live a life that seemed enviable in a certain way compared to farmers. And what I mean by that is that they didn’t work very long hours. They seemed that most of the time they only had to gather for a few hours a day. And, obviously, there’s an issue there, which is, What do you consider work? So is walking around hoping you’ll find something, but you don’t actually hunt—is that work? Or is it only while you’re actually chasing the animal? So that was one of the issues.And then another issue is: When you’re a hunter-gatherer, the real problem you have is that it’s not so much about how much you eat during the average periods of times, but it’s what you do when things are very bad. And so for an anthropologist who happens to be there in a regular year, it looks like everything is great. But every 10 years, maybe, there’s a really bad year, and there’s a famine, and everybody’s starving. Now, if you don’t happen to be there in the year in which they’re having a famine, then you don’t understand why anybody would like to switch. That would be one of the caveats I would put to that hunter-gatherer issue.And then we get to the 1980s. There was this very important book, very important also for my research, that was [by] Cohen and Armelagos. There was an edited volume from a conference in which they called hunter-gatherers the original affluent society, in the sense that what they find from many studies from many places around the world is that the farmers are actually shorter. The first farmers are shorter, much shorter, sometimes up to 10 centimeters shorter than the last hunter-gatherers. And basically, the first farmers, they get short, and they stay as short as subsistence farmers are to this day, while the hunter-gatherers—only in the last 50 to 100 years have a lot of people become as tall as the last hunter-gatherers.Demsas: Mmm.Matranga: And this was obviously very surprising to them. Basically, it was a continuation of this theory that perhaps it was better when we were hunter-gatherers. And then the question was: Why did they start farming if hunting and gathering was so great? And so there is this other article by Jared Diamond, and he called agriculture “the worst mistake in the history of the human race.” What he thought was it was runaway population growth.And basically, what happens is that people think they know how the world works, so they start farming. And because you start farming, you become sedentary. And once you’re sedentary, you can have a lot more kids. Because if you’re nomadic, of course, if you have to carry your kids around, you’re going to naturally have to space out the births. And so once we become sedentary, we start having so many kids that, actually, we end up worse off than the way that we started. And what I think is interesting there is that there’s a sense in which theories of the Neolithic tend to mirror the political anxieties and the social anxieties of the time in which people came up with them and in which they found favor.So, you know, obviously in the ’80s—WWF, environmentalism, Earth Day—people are worried about runaway population growth. So obviously, in the Neolithic, they must also have had runaway population growth. There’s this interesting mix of the current events bleeding into history, which you can also see with the Roman Empire. So everybody used to think it was because they debased the currency in the ’70s, because there was inflation in the U.S.Demsas: And now it’s immigration. (Laughs.)Matranga: Exactly. And now it’s immigration.Demsas: It’s so surprising, all of a sudden.Matranga: Exactly. So I sometimes tell students that there’s no such thing in history. There’s current events in period costume.Demsas: (Laughs.)Matranga: I’m exaggerating.Demsas: It’s also a way in which our time period allows us to reflect on similarities with previous times. The Diamond one, I think, is particularly interesting. I was reading that 1987 paper. I looked it up. He was born in, like, the 1930s, so he’s in his 20s when the environmentalist and population-ethics concerns really take off. And it’s really striking. He writes, “Recent discoveries suggest that the adoption of agriculture, supposedly our most decisive step toward a better life, was in many ways a catastrophe from which we have never recovered. With agriculture came the gross social and sexual inequality, the disease and despotism, the curse of our existence.”It’s one of those things—I think it’s useful to think through the ways that it’s possible that you may have made a very early mistake. Like, you maybe have reached an optimal point on a mountain, but you climbed a shorter mountain, and you have to go all the way back down to find a taller mountain.But can you walk us through some of the evidence for seeing farming as a decline in living standards? Where is that coming from? I know you mentioned the height thing, but I remember reading there’s something also about increase in violence and other sorts of problems.Matranga: Yes, absolutely. First of all, one of the things I want to just say to begin with is that it’s hard, for example, for things such as violence, in the sense that the selection pressure on archaeological remains from nomads is very different from the selection pressure for the remains of sedentary populations, simply because it’s a lot easier that remains from nomads might be very shallowly buried or not elaborately buried, while, instead, once you become settled, perhaps you have slightly more ornate tombs, which are easier to find, and other things that tend to preserve the remains.Demsas: So we might be missing a bunch of information about the hunter-gatherer period.Matranga: Yes, especially with things like child mortality. A lot of nomadic groups seem to not have considered kids fully humans, basically, until they were a few years old, just because the child mortality was so horrendously high, just through diseases and other things, that perhaps we have very different selective pressures.But one of the other things that for sure we have is joint diseases. So it looks that the farmers were working more, because they tended to have more arthritis. And the joints on which they have arthritis are the ones that we would expect them to have if they were doing a lot of general farm work, digging, that sort of thing.And also the grinding—the daily grind, right? It’s sort of an idiomatic expression because once you have these seeds—if I give you just, like, Oh, you’re hungry? Here’s a bag of unpopped popcorn.Demsas: (Laughs.) Yeah.Matranga: It’s like, What are you going to do with them? You have to put them on a rock and just grind them for hours and hours every day.Demsas: I had no idea where the “daily grind” came from. I didn’t know that’s where it came from.Matranga: Well, I didn’t until I said it.Demsas: (Laughs.) So maybe you made it up. Okay.Matranga: So maybe we can get one of the producers to check it. But it just came to me as I was saying it. I was like, Oh, I guess that’s where that’s from.But to process that in an efficient way is also incredibly labor-intensive, and so their joint diseases reflect that, as well. And they also have something called porotic hyperostosis, which is, like—you get spongy bone tissue. And that is connected to anemia. So it looks like they were missing iron. And so these are some of the ways in which people have assumed that, basically, from almost everything that you could find, it looks like the farmers were actually eating less, on average, than the hunter-gatherers that came before them.[Music]Demsas: After the break: how the history of agriculture is actually a story about low construction costs.[Break]Demsas: So it’s in this backdrop that your research kind of comes in, right? People are assuming that it has to be a forced choice, because it’s obviously worse to have been a farmer than to be a hunter-gatherer.But you have a paper that, I think, really explores and lays out a different way of thinking about things. Before you get into the meat of it, can you tell me about the genesis for the idea? What got you looking at seasonality as a predictor of the Neolithic Revolution?Matranga: Absolutely. This is a little bit like that scene in Forrest Gump where he starts running, and he says, Well, I thought I’d run until the end of the street, and then I got to the end of the street, so I thought I’d just run into town. And 10 years later, he’s still running.So the origin of this was that I visited my mom, and my mom was teaching Italian, as it was, at the University of Isfahan in Iran. And we went to see this ziggurat in Chogha Zanbil, which is one of those step pyramids. And I was trying to take a picture of this pyramid, and it was very hard to get a good contrast between the pyramid and the ground. And then what happened was I realized, Oh, of course, it’s hard because it’s made out of mud bricks. It’s made out of literally the same stuff that it’s sitting on. They compress it into bricks and dry them and then stack them, and that’s the pyramid.And so then I was thinking, Well, why would agriculture originate from an area with very low construction costs? And so the idea was, Well, the reason why you would need low construction costs is because, once you farm, you’re going to get all of your food in one room at one point of the year after the harvest.Demsas: And sorry—you’re saying that it was already established that farming had begun in places with low construction costs, or you came across this idea yourself?Matranga: No. So the typical idea is: It starts here because it’s the Fertile Crescent, and it’s so fertile. And the problem with this theory is that the Fertile Crescent is very fertile if you compare it to, you know, the deserts north and south of it. But it’s not very fertile compared to any other place in the world. So it’s not very different in terms of the types of soil and the rainfall patterns than any other place, for example, on the north coast of the Mediterranean.So the idea was: That’s why it started. That’s why it’s called the Fertile Crescent. And then I realized, Well, isn’t it weird that it happens to also be the place in the world with the lowest construction costs? Because it’s on an alluvial plain, so everything is clay that you can make mud bricks out of. And it doesn’t rain, so that means that it’s not gonna erode it, so you don’t have to bake the bricks, which takes a lot of energy. You just need to sun dry them, stack them, and that’s your building.Then the idea was, Well, why would it be connected that you start agriculture, or at least it blossoms, in a place that has low construction cost? And I thought, One possibility is that they needed to defend their grain stores. So once you’ve harvested all this food, you’ve put it all in a room. Well, now that’s very attractive to any would-be thieves that would like to come and perhaps kill you and steal it. And that was my undergraduate thesis.Then fast-forward a couple of years, and I’m doing a master’s, which later morphed into my Ph.D. at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. And I take this course with Hans-Joachim Voth, who later became my advisor, and it’s an Economic History course. And I tell him about what my undergraduate thesis was. And he tells me, It’s interesting, this idea of storage, because there’s this literature that says that hunter-gatherers were actually better off than farmers. And so it could be that maybe you can do some model where there’s some shocks from year to year, and having the granary helps you smooth out the consumption. And so the granary is also important for this reason. See what you can do with it. And I wrote a little paper for the course, and that was that.From there, then the question was if this is just proof of concept that one of the advantages, that it could be when you start farming, is that you’re able to smooth your consumption. And so that’s why you accept a lower average standard of living, but you don’t get killed by famines when they happen every 10 years or so.Demsas: It’s like insurance. You, as a human, are like, Okay, I’ll accept less food now, but I know I won’t starve in some forthcoming year.Matranga: Exactly. And at that point, the story was still about variation from year to year, so I’m worried about famines. And a while after that, I came upon this paper by a French anthropologist called Alain Testart, and what this paper was about—it wasn’t really about farming. It was more about hunter-gatherers that become sedentary. And this happens.Usually, we associate hunting and gathering with being nomadic, because you’re chasing the game around, or you’re moving up and down the mountains, depending on the seasons. And he said this isn’t really always the case. There’s many cases around the world of hunter-gatherers who are sedentary and have remained sedentary for centuries and millennia without progressing to agriculture.And a classical example of this are the Native American cultures of the Pacific Northwest. And so there they exploited the salmon run. And so there’s all these millions and millions of salmons that want to reach their breeding grounds in the upland streams. And to do that, they have to pass through these rivers. And the Native Americans, they had these elaborate traps with which they capture the sustainably large, but sustainable—obviously, they wanted to let some through so that they’d reproduce a number of salmon. They’d skin them, and they’d smoke them, and they’d dry them. And that way, they had stores of food that would last them until the next salmon run, which is in the fall.And he said, If you look at these groups, they have very hierarchical societies. They have elaborate material cultures. And so they had almost everything that we would associate with a farming community except the farming itself. Of course, the reason why they didn’t develop farming was because—it’s important, you know. The salmon is just a salmon. It’s gonna lay the eggs where it wants, and then it’s gonna go into the sea and live in the North Pacific for a few years, and then it’s gonna come back. That was an example of nomads which became sedentary and remain sedentary for hundreds and thousands of years without having farming.And he said, And what’s crucial is that there’s food which is abundant and seasonal. And that was, like, my aha moment, because we take this story about sedentary hunter-gatherers, and then we could say, Maybe this is the stepping stone between being a nomadic hunter-gatherer and being a sedentary farmer. Because there’s this chicken-and-egg problem. Because if you’re always moving around, then how can you learn how to farm? And instead, if you don’t know how to farm, then why would you become sedentary? Because all the food is moving away. The game is moving away. You’re exhausting your local area, the plants. Why wouldn’t you just move to some other place where there’s more food?Demsas: And you’d need multiple seasons to figure out how to farm appropriately for your region.Matranga: Exactly. And so the idea was, by taking this Testart paper, I could say they would become sedentary first because they want to store food. And once they are sedentary and they’re storing food, then they’re preadapted for discovering agriculture, because storing food and being sedentary are two things you need to know how to do if you’re going to be a farmer. So at least you figured out that part of it before. And you do this because you’re trying to avoid seasonality, as Testart said. And this is when I switched from, instead of the problem being a famine every 15 years or whatever, then the problem is this periodic, predictable famine, which happens every year, which we call winter.And so in order to avoid all starving in winter, we can just sit in one place, gather all these abundant foods in the places where these exist, store them, and then we can process them and eat them as we go along throughout the year, and then the next year we can do the whole thing again. And it was funny because I found this paper—it was a friend of mine’s birthday, and I had to call her and tell her, I’m sorry, but I can’t come, because I found the paper that sort of unlocks everything for me. And I’m just too excited about it, and I wouldn’t be much company.Demsas: Did she forgive you?Matranga: Yes. I mean, she already knew. It was baked into the pie. You know, we’d known each other a while.And so that’s when he moved from, you know, once-in-a-while famine to predictable scarcity, which is seasonality. And from there, then my next step was, why would it be in—because one of the things that’s been observed is that the Neolithic Revolution happens right after the end of the Ice Age. And so the traditional interpretation by a bunch of people was: The Ice Age ends. Before, it’s just too cold to farm in the Middle East, and so nobody was farming there. And then when the Ice Age ends, then there’s the right climate for farming. And then you can farm.And there’s two issues here, I think. And one of them was that if the climate is really good for farming, then it could also be really good for hunting and gathering. There might also be more wild animals. There might also be more wild plants. So it’s not entirely clear to me that a better climate automatically makes things better for farming. So that would be my first point.And the second point is that if all you needed was a warm climate, then why couldn’t you farm during the Ice Age but, like, a thousand miles south of where you farmed when the Ice Age ended? Because it’s not like it was a snowball Earth. If you went to the equator, you know, it was still warm. And so my idea was: What was missing during the Ice Age were locations that were really good in summer but really bad in winter, because the issue with the equator isn’t that it’s too warm. The problem is that it’s warm the whole year-round—Demsas: Yeah, so you would never start farming.Matranga: —and therefore you don’t need to store. And the important thing is you never become sedentary in order to store, which then leads you to not starting to farm. What happens when the Ice Age ends? Now, there’s places that first it was, let’s say, –20 [degrees] in the winter and –5 in the summer. So there is seasonality, but all of the seasonality is below freezing. So it doesn’t really matter. It’s just a frozen hellscape year-round.Well, now, if you think that moves, you know, sort of parallel, both the summer and the winter become warmer. Now you’re going to have a winter which is like –5, which is really bad. But now in the summer, let’s say it’s plus-15. Sorry—this is Celsius. I should have prefaced that. And so, basically, what happens is that now the summer is quite good, while the winter is abysmal.And the question is: How can we exploit these very good summer conditions without getting stuck here in the winter, or without all dying in the winter? And of course, if you’re a stork, then that’s really not a problem, right? You can fly. You can go to this really warm place in the summer, have your nest there, and then in the winter, you just go back to Africa, and that’s perfect. But if you’re humans, and you’re carrying kids with you, then obviously that’s not going to work.And so you cannot migrate your way out of a Northern Hemisphere winter. So their solution was to store food. And so they say, We can move to these places first. During the summer, we gather all the food, and then we can store it and consume it throughout the long winter. And then the next summer, we do that again. And that was sort of, like, my first idea of why it happens right after the end of the Ice Age.Demsas: Okay, so the theory is, basically: The Ice Age ends. There’s more seasonality, meaning that the difference between summer and winter increases, so you have these kind of highly variable seasons that we’re used to now. Then people are then incentivized to store, so that they can store food for the winter. And as they’re remaining stable, they discover farming in order to supplement their diets.Matranga: Exactly. And so the basic idea is: Once you’re sedentary, then, you know, for sure, like—I mean, what is farming? Farming is you’re expending labor in order to increase the amount of food that the land produces. So farming is really on a spectrum. Because a very simple thing you could do is chase away grazing animals so that they don’t eat the fields that you’re going to need in order to get the seed from it during the harvest season. And so that’s, in a sense, farming because you’re expending labor just chasing away the animals, and perhaps then you fence them. And then the next thing you could do is say, Well, last year, a lot of this area was flooded. So I’m going to dig a drainage ditch. And this way, when it rains, you don’t have standing water. The crops don’t rot. And we’re going to have more food the next harvest season. And then you can start doing all of these little things, which, put together, then amount to farming.But I’ll just go back for a second to the seasonality issue, because what I later found out was that, actually, according to this theory by Serbian physicist called Milanković, it’s actually increases in seasonality which make the Ice Age end. And so what happens is that Earth’s axis is tilted—and famously, this is what causes the seasons—but sometimes it’s more tilted, and sometimes it’s less tilted. And there’s also other variations in Earth’s orbital parameters, and these influence the amount of seasonality that you have in the Northern Hemisphere and in the Southern Hemisphere. And so it’s not really that it was just the end of the Ice Age which caused seasonality to increase, but really there was this big increase in seasonality, which caused the Ice Age to end and also caused the start of agriculture.Demsas: I would expect that there would have been farming that could come in and out of vogue. I’m curious why we don’t see that in your findings.Matranga: I completely think that farming probably happened on some hillside 70,000 years ago and on some other hillside 30,000 years ago and some other place 15,000 years ago. And, you know, what I find really interesting and important about farming isn’t so much the fact that they did it once. It’s the fact that it’s a model which is able of spreading.If it was just something that happened once on one hillside and then stayed there—or perhaps, you know, like the salmon run in the Pacific Northwest—that’s a fantastic accomplishment by the population that does it, but it doesn’t transform the world. Because you cannot take those salmon, bring them to a river in Iowa, and then, you know, just replicate your community in some other place. What’s special about farming is that it does sort of spread, and that it does eventually occupy most of the landmass of the world. And so it’s sort of what I call a franchisable model. It’s not just something that works in one place. You can copy-paste it all over the place.And so I think it probably happened on some hill, but that’s not super interesting. It would be super interesting, of course, from an anthropological aspect, to find that one hillside where it happened 30,000 years ago. But that didn’t change the history of the world, clearly.I think, in order to have that, you have to have a wide area in which there’s a lot of seasonality so that when somebody invents, first, you know, storage and sedentarism and then agriculture, then they’re able to take this packet of seeds, bring it to another place, give it to their kids. Their kids can found a colony. Perhaps they displace the local population. Perhaps they intermarry with it, perhaps not a lot of people. You know, I’m sure all three happened in different places at different times. And then their kids can do it in another place, and so you can colonize other places with this technology, or other people can copy this technology and do it in other places. And in order to have this, I think you need both the seasonality but, also, it needs to be on a wide enough area that it’s instantly appealing to everybody because they think, This is just what we’ve been waiting for, a chance to not all starve every February.Demsas: Hopefully you can unpack why it was such a dominant strategy, right? Because you write in your paper, “Our ancestors traded a risky but abundant lifestyle for a more stable but less prosperous one, driven by risk aversion, particularly among populations near subsistence levels.” And I would imagine that you would expect to see variation based on different populations’ risk tolerance and also desire to kind of smooth their consumption. And also, it seems like there’d be a real free rider problem. Like, nomads could just go around just attacking sedentary populations, taking their food, and moving on. So it’s interesting to me that it ended up being such a dominant strategy to stay put.Matranga: Yeah, so in terms of, obviously, the risk of raids, I think that would go back to my undergraduate thesis of sort of the importance of having some way of defending. So the first places that do this are actually, like, these hillsides—Jarmo, for example, was an early one—that are very steep on all sides. And, you know, the point is that with that, you kind of need a very specific land conformation, where it’s just the right shape of a hill, and there’s water, and there’s fields close to it, and there’s a way to get from the fields to the hill. And, you know, how many hillsides like that can you find? So the convenient thing is: Once you invent fortifications, then you can build a wall, and so build your own quote-unquote hill in the middle of the fertile plain, which is what they do with sort of Mesopotamia.So that’s one aspect to it. The other one is that some people remain nomadic for a very long time, usually because either it’s too cold, the growing season is too short, or otherwise the rainfall is too low, and so they’re not able to farm, and the only way that they can survive in a viable number of people is by constantly moving around. But what they usually do, at that point, is they become pastoralists.One way of seeing this is that it’s not just a matter of risk aversion, because in the end, if your risk aversion, high or low that it is—let’s say that you’re a complete nervous Nellie. You don’t want to take any risk, and you just eat grubs from under a stone, because you never want to leave your immediate area. Well, you’re probably not going to reproduce very fast, which means that either some neighbors that accepted a little bit more risk and have much higher average amount of food have more kids than you, and they can displace you, or even if you somehow intermarry with them, probably they’re not gonna accept your viewpoint on risk aversion. So the risk aversion, in the end, is something which leads you to make some choices, and these choices have some effects on the viability of your group.Demsas: Yeah. I feel like the fertility question is really interesting here because it’s both that once you begin farming, you have to send your kids out to go farm themselves, but it increases the number of children that are born, too, that survive?Matranga: I would say both. When you’re walking, when you’re nomadic, in principle, you cannot have more than one kid per parent, because somebody has to carry them, at least when they are, you know, below 6—because 6-year-olds can walk, but they can’t walk as fast as grown-ups.The second aspect of this is that there’s so many diseases where if you could just stay in a place that’s warm for a couple of weeks, the kid would be fine. But if you’re in the middle of your migration, that’s it.And the other thing is that when you’re constantly breastfeeding and moving around, you’re probably not gonna put on a lot of weight. And it would appear that a lot of hunter-gatherer women would take a few years to even be fertile again. Because they just would not achieve that—I forget if it’s 15 or 18 percent or—whatever the number is of body fat where your body can even conceive.So absolutely, when you become sedentary, you can have more kids. And I think even if you want to remain nomadic, if there’s these farmers which are having way more kids than you survive, then if there’s ever any conflict—maybe now, maybe in two centuries—then very likely, the farmers are going to get their way.Demsas: I’m curious about us returning to what you started this conversation with, which is the question about whether or not it was a good idea for us to move out of the hunter-gatherer stage to the farming stage. Because your paper has something to say, also, about whether we’re over-reading the evidence about humans being worse off nutritionally when they become farmers. So what’s your pushback on this question about, Maybe nutrition was actually improved once you become a farmer?Matranga: Yes, absolutely. It’s interesting because the first concrete evidence of anything that I found in support of my thesis was what I’m about to tell you. And it’s something called “Harris lines.” So Harris was a pathologist. I believe that one of his kids had a pretty severe disease. For some reason, he saw an X-ray of his kid, and he noticed that he had this line in their bones, sort of a transverse line. So, you know, like, not in the direction of the bone—kind of like a tree ring along the growth.And so then he explored this more, and he found out that when there is an episode of growth arrest of a child that is growing normally, then—for example, this could be a disease, or it could be that you’re not eating—and so there’s what’s called a “metabolic insult.” Your metabolism is not producing enough energy to both keep you alive while growing, and so then you have growth arrest.And then when you start eating well again, or the disease passes, then there’s something called catch-up growth. So the body actually grows faster, because it’s trying to get back on the growth curve that it was on originally. And as it’s growing faster, it deposits this different kind of bone, which you can see from X-rays. And so it’s a little bit like a tree ring, but for mammals.And the interesting thing is that from that same Cohen and Armelagos 1984 book, Paleopathology at the Origins of Agriculture, it also looks like the hunter-gatherers had—they were taller, up to 10 centimeters taller, but they also had—way more of these Harris lines, or growth-arrest lines, in their bones, sometimes as many as six per individual, on average, in some populations. And they also appeared to be evenly spaced, just like tree rings. And so to them, this suggested that almost every year, there would be a period of famine.And so it really looks like it was this insurance trade-off that you mentioned before, which is that, you know: The hunter-gatherers, they ate a lot, but for a few months, at least, every year, it looks like they were starving, while the farmers, they ate less, on average, but they always ate. They were able to smooth their consumption from summer to winter, logically.And I think that one of the reasons this had not been proposed before was because as sedentary people with bank accounts and granaries, you know, usually our problems are not about, like, I’m eating a lot this week, but what am I going to eat next week? But if you are a nomad, and you’re not able to store food, then that, I think, would be the dominant concern, and I think that’s why we accepted this trade-off. Like, Sure, we’re just going to be shorter. That’s fine. But, you know, at least we don’t starve for a couple of months every year.Demsas: So you think this is the correct trade-off? You don’t buy the thesis that we made a mistake?Matranga: No, no. I think we did a great trade-off. In fact, I think that part of the problem with, even, development goals—they tend to be phrased in terms of averages. We would like people to make, at least, $5 or $10 a day, on average, throughout the year. And then how can we get them to invest? Or how can we take them to become entrepreneurial and so on? But when you’re this close to starvation, I think that the average, obviously, you think about it, as well. But what you’re really worried about is, What am I going to eat in the worst possible case that could happen to me within the next 30 years?Because the way that they survived as a population through the centuries was by taking the worst case into possibility. If I take a statistic of a country, and I measure their income every year, and for 25 years, it’s quite good, and then they all die in the 26th year, the average income is still very good, but that’s a complete disaster for the population involved.And so if anything, I think that our way of measuring success is, again, predicated on the fact that we do have insurance, and we do have bank accounts, and we do have granaries. And so our worries are more about averages, while if you are a hunter-gatherer, your life is dominated by the worst outcome. And I think it was a correct choice. In fact, it was so correct that we forgot how awful it is to be eating a whole wildebeest that you killed and still be worried about what you’re going to eat next week.Demsas: Well, Andrea, always our final question: What is something that you thought was a good idea at the time but ended up only being good on paper?Matranga: As a personal anecdote, I’d spent a lot of time figuring out a good way to move to the U.S. And I loved my time in the U.S., but then I realized that moving continents is very difficult when you still have family back home. And the things that you like and that you think you’re going to enjoy when you’re 25 and don’t have kids, then once you have a family, you have to move backwards and forwards and all the summer stuff, then it starts to wear on you.So I just realized, after being incredibly internationally minded, I still love traveling and visiting places, but I became much more homeward bound in my aspirations as time went by.Demsas: Yeah. Well, Andrea, thank you so much for coming on the show.Matranga: Absolutely. My absolute pleasure. Anytime.[Music]Demsas: Good on Paper is produced by Jinae West. It was edited by Dave Shaw, fact-checked by Ena Alvarado, and engineered by Erica Huang. Our theme music is composed by Rob Smierciak. Claudine Ebeid is the executive producer of Atlantic audio. Andrea Valdez is our managing editor.And hey, if you like what you’re hearing, please leave us a rating and review on Apple Podcasts.I’m Jerusalem Demsas, and we’ll see you next week.[Music]Matranga: So it was funny, because if you had asked me, What would you say is good on paper? And I was ready to say, Well, for all my office and copier paper needs, I use Dunder Mifflin, the paper supplier. But the setup—Demsas: The setup was too different? You were going to go with Dunder Mifflin? That’s so funny.

Should we be jealous of our hunter-gatherer ancestors?

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After 200,000 years of hunting and gathering, a history-defining decision was made. Starting roughly 12,000 years ago, at least seven different groups of humans independently began to settle down and begin farming. In so doing, they planted the seeds for modern civilization. This is traditionally told as a straightforward story of human progress. After humans made the switch, population growth increased, spurring innovative and creative endeavors that our ancestors couldn’t even imagine.

One counterintuitive strain of thought has treated this decision as “the worst mistake in the history of the human race,” as the popular author Jared Diamond once put it. The argument largely rests on research that shows our nomadic forebears were healthier and had more leisure time than those who chose to farm. Diamond, who wrote this article in 1987, when overpopulation concerns were rampant within the American environmental movement, argued that, “forced to choose between limiting population or trying to increase food production, we chose the latter and ended up with starvation, warfare, and tyranny.”

Sometimes unorthodox ideas are unorthodox for a reason. On today’s episode of Good on Paper, I’m joined by Andrea Matranga, an economist whose recent paper “The Ant and the Grasshopper: Seasonality and the Invention of Agriculture” argues that the Neolithic revolution happened as a result of climactic changes that necessitated storing food for the winter. Matranga rejects the idea that the past 12,000 years of human development were a mistake, one that underrates the threats of famine and starvation endemic to nomadic life.

“There’s a sense in which theories of the Neolithic tend to mirror the political anxieties and the social anxieties of the time in which people came up with them and in which they found favor,” Matranga tells me. “So, you know, obviously in the ’80s—WWF, environmentalism, Earth Day—people are worried about runaway population growth. So obviously in the Neolithic, they must also have had runaway population growth. There’s this interesting mix of the current events bleeding into history.”


The following is a transcript of the episode:

[Music]

Jerusalem Demsas: One of Aesop’s Fables is called “The Ant and the Grasshopper.” As the story goes, a hungry grasshopper comes up to a group of ants in the wintertime and asks them for some food to eat. They are shocked and ask him why he hasn’t stored anything up before the weather got cold. And he replies that he’d eaten well during the summer and made music while the weather was warm. The moral of the story is pretty straightforward: Save while times are good.

But for most of human history, for 200,000 years, humanity was much more like the grasshopper than the ants. As hunter-gatherers, we ate well when resources were plentiful but didn’t save for winter, making us susceptible to starvation and death.

But then something changed. Around the world, within a relatively short period of time, a bunch of humans independently began farming—and kept farming. How did this happen?

[Music]

My name’s Jerusalem Demsas. I’m a staff writer here at The Atlantic, and this is Good on Paper. It’s a policy show that questions what we really know about popular narratives.

In a paper called “The Ant and the Grasshopper: Seasonality and the Invention of Agriculture,” economist Andrea Matranga formalizes a theory for how humans went from grasshoppers to ants—for how we went from hunting and gathering to settled farming.

Climate seasonality increased, meaning winters got harsher and summers got drier. Hunter-gatherers couldn’t keep up with wildlife that fled for warmer climates. Birds can fly south for winters. Humans can’t. So they realized they needed to start storing food during good times. That meant the end of our nomadic lifestyles because people had to remain near those stores.

This paper intervenes in the literature in a couple of important ways I explored with Andrea: First, it helps untangle the mystery of how humans became farmers to begin with. But second, it pushes back against the strangely nostalgic idea that our nomadic existence was somehow better than farming—an idea that holds sway among a surprising number of people.

Let’s dive in.

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Demsas: Andrea, welcome to the show.

Andrea Matranga: Thank you so much. Thank you for having me.

Demsas: Yeah. So we’re here to talk about a very fun new paper that you’ve recently published at [The Quarterly Journal of Economics], and it’s about the Neolithic Revolution. We’re trying to go all the way back in time. We’ve done some development episodes, but this is further back than I think we’ve ever, ever gone.

I want to start with what the Neolithic Revolution was. Can you set the stage for us?

Matranga: Yes, absolutely. Neolithic means “new stone,” and it was first detected as a change in the shape of the stone tools that they were using. And then, eventually, they realized that the reason they changed the shape of the tools was also because they changed the subsistence method, meaning that before that—in the Paleolithic, in the Old Stone Age—everybody was a hunter-gatherer, meaning that they were subsisting on foods that grew wild, which they would collect, process, and consume. And then in the Neolithic, or New Stone Age, they started to grow their own food. So the origins of agriculture is what distinguishes the paleo from the Neolithic.

Demsas: And around how long ago are we talking?

Matranga: It was about 11,500 years ago in the Middle East. And there were seven of these places, and the two latest ones were in sub-Saharan Africa and in eastern North America, where it was about 4,500 years ago.

Demsas: You’ve just laid out the span of a few thousand years here where, in a bunch of different places across the world, people are independently inventing farming and agriculture. You said in sub-Saharan Africa but also in the Middle East, north and south China, the Andes, Mexico, North America. How do we know that these developments were independent? And what sorts of evidence do we have from archaeology or otherwise that signal when farming began?

Matranga: Yeah, absolutely. For some, it’s very easy. Obviously, if you look at eastern North America versus sub-Saharan Africa, these are two populations which had not had any cultural mixture, so clearly those two have to be independent.

When you go from, let’s say, south China and north China or the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, then it becomes a little bit murkier. Usually, the arguments that are made are that there’s no other signs of cultural contact, in the sense that the pottery styles are different; the crops that are being grown are different. Usually, you would expect that if they start doing barley and emmer wheat in the Middle East—if you thought that farmers had arrived with this knowledge of it into the Sahel region of Africa, you’d expect them to try to do some of those crops first, and then maybe they find some other crops that work better. And instead, it’s sort of completely disjoint. And that’s usually the way that they think about it.

Now, could it be that the idea that somebody was farming some distance away made their way through it? It’s possible, though one of the things is that there’s so many populations today, or in the recent past, that when they were contacted, they had knowledge of plant biology. So they understood perfectly well that if you plant a seed, a plant would grow. But they still hadn’t started farming. They were still hunting and gatherers. And so just knowing that it’s possible to do it doesn’t mean that you have a coherent sort of structure and a strategy for doing it as a population. So for example, I know that if you plant a seed, something grows, but that doesn’t mean I could sustain myself as a farmer.

Demsas: (Laughs.) Yes.

Matranga: So it still seems that, at least in the sort of making all the parts fit together, these things definitely happened independently in these places.

Demsas: But for most of human history, we’re talking about—I mean, 12,000 years ago is obviously a long time ago—but we’re talking about hundreds of thousands of years before then, where we’re a hunter-gathering and are nomads. And so this question of why we make this switch as a species is really, really interesting.

And before we get into your research, I’m hoping that we can talk through how the field was thinking about the advent of the Neolithic Revolution. And what were some of the prevailing theories about why agriculture emerged after the last Ice Age?

Matranga: Absolutely. So one of the things that happened was that, obviously, we didn’t have as many excavations done, let’s say, in 1900 as we have today. And we didn’t have as good, for example, DNA—we didn’t have DNA at all—but DNA sequencing and other stuff like that. We have much more tools. So obviously, then the theories have also kept pace with the new information that was uncovered.

If you look at the earliest theories—Darwin talks about this a little bit but also, let’s say, Braidwood—there are mainly theories about the Middle East because that one was the one where people knew that there had been a Neolithic transition. It was the first one to be excavated. And so most of the explanations are particular to the Middle East. And so one of the arguments that was made was that there might have been a climate desiccation, so it became drier around those years. And when it became drier, people were forced into these oases where there was still water. Therefore, once they were sort of constrained to these small areas, then it was easier to start farming and also necessary because there was just much less land that was fertile enough for hunting and gathering. And so you start taking better care about the land that you already have.

And then as you go forward, then one of the things that appeared in the 1960s was the fact that, actually, very often the hunter-gatherers seemed to live a life that seemed enviable in a certain way compared to farmers. And what I mean by that is that they didn’t work very long hours. They seemed that most of the time they only had to gather for a few hours a day. And, obviously, there’s an issue there, which is, What do you consider work? So is walking around hoping you’ll find something, but you don’t actually hunt—is that work? Or is it only while you’re actually chasing the animal? So that was one of the issues.

And then another issue is: When you’re a hunter-gatherer, the real problem you have is that it’s not so much about how much you eat during the average periods of times, but it’s what you do when things are very bad. And so for an anthropologist who happens to be there in a regular year, it looks like everything is great. But every 10 years, maybe, there’s a really bad year, and there’s a famine, and everybody’s starving. Now, if you don’t happen to be there in the year in which they’re having a famine, then you don’t understand why anybody would like to switch. That would be one of the caveats I would put to that hunter-gatherer issue.

And then we get to the 1980s. There was this very important book, very important also for my research, that was [by] Cohen and Armelagos. There was an edited volume from a conference in which they called hunter-gatherers the original affluent society, in the sense that what they find from many studies from many places around the world is that the farmers are actually shorter. The first farmers are shorter, much shorter, sometimes up to 10 centimeters shorter than the last hunter-gatherers. And basically, the first farmers, they get short, and they stay as short as subsistence farmers are to this day, while the hunter-gatherers—only in the last 50 to 100 years have a lot of people become as tall as the last hunter-gatherers.

Demsas: Mmm.

Matranga: And this was obviously very surprising to them. Basically, it was a continuation of this theory that perhaps it was better when we were hunter-gatherers. And then the question was: Why did they start farming if hunting and gathering was so great? And so there is this other article by Jared Diamond, and he called agriculture “the worst mistake in the history of the human race.” What he thought was it was runaway population growth.

And basically, what happens is that people think they know how the world works, so they start farming. And because you start farming, you become sedentary. And once you’re sedentary, you can have a lot more kids. Because if you’re nomadic, of course, if you have to carry your kids around, you’re going to naturally have to space out the births. And so once we become sedentary, we start having so many kids that, actually, we end up worse off than the way that we started. And what I think is interesting there is that there’s a sense in which theories of the Neolithic tend to mirror the political anxieties and the social anxieties of the time in which people came up with them and in which they found favor.

So, you know, obviously in the ’80s—WWF, environmentalism, Earth Day—people are worried about runaway population growth. So obviously, in the Neolithic, they must also have had runaway population growth. There’s this interesting mix of the current events bleeding into history, which you can also see with the Roman Empire. So everybody used to think it was because they debased the currency in the ’70s, because there was inflation in the U.S.

Demsas: And now it’s immigration. (Laughs.)

Matranga: Exactly. And now it’s immigration.

Demsas: It’s so surprising, all of a sudden.

Matranga: Exactly. So I sometimes tell students that there’s no such thing in history. There’s current events in period costume.

Demsas: (Laughs.)

Matranga: I’m exaggerating.

Demsas: It’s also a way in which our time period allows us to reflect on similarities with previous times. The Diamond one, I think, is particularly interesting. I was reading that 1987 paper. I looked it up. He was born in, like, the 1930s, so he’s in his 20s when the environmentalist and population-ethics concerns really take off. And it’s really striking. He writes, “Recent discoveries suggest that the adoption of agriculture, supposedly our most decisive step toward a better life, was in many ways a catastrophe from which we have never recovered. With agriculture came the gross social and sexual inequality, the disease and despotism, the curse of our existence.”

It’s one of those things—I think it’s useful to think through the ways that it’s possible that you may have made a very early mistake. Like, you maybe have reached an optimal point on a mountain, but you climbed a shorter mountain, and you have to go all the way back down to find a taller mountain.

But can you walk us through some of the evidence for seeing farming as a decline in living standards? Where is that coming from? I know you mentioned the height thing, but I remember reading there’s something also about increase in violence and other sorts of problems.

Matranga: Yes, absolutely. First of all, one of the things I want to just say to begin with is that it’s hard, for example, for things such as violence, in the sense that the selection pressure on archaeological remains from nomads is very different from the selection pressure for the remains of sedentary populations, simply because it’s a lot easier that remains from nomads might be very shallowly buried or not elaborately buried, while, instead, once you become settled, perhaps you have slightly more ornate tombs, which are easier to find, and other things that tend to preserve the remains.

Demsas: So we might be missing a bunch of information about the hunter-gatherer period.

Matranga: Yes, especially with things like child mortality. A lot of nomadic groups seem to not have considered kids fully humans, basically, until they were a few years old, just because the child mortality was so horrendously high, just through diseases and other things, that perhaps we have very different selective pressures.

But one of the other things that for sure we have is joint diseases. So it looks that the farmers were working more, because they tended to have more arthritis. And the joints on which they have arthritis are the ones that we would expect them to have if they were doing a lot of general farm work, digging, that sort of thing.

And also the grinding—the daily grind, right? It’s sort of an idiomatic expression because once you have these seeds—if I give you just, like, Oh, you’re hungry? Here’s a bag of unpopped popcorn.

Demsas: (Laughs.) Yeah.

Matranga: It’s like, What are you going to do with them? You have to put them on a rock and just grind them for hours and hours every day.

Demsas: I had no idea where the “daily grind” came from. I didn’t know that’s where it came from.

Matranga: Well, I didn’t until I said it.

Demsas: (Laughs.) So maybe you made it up. Okay.

Matranga: So maybe we can get one of the producers to check it. But it just came to me as I was saying it. I was like, Oh, I guess that’s where that’s from.

But to process that in an efficient way is also incredibly labor-intensive, and so their joint diseases reflect that, as well. And they also have something called porotic hyperostosis, which is, like—you get spongy bone tissue. And that is connected to anemia. So it looks like they were missing iron. And so these are some of the ways in which people have assumed that, basically, from almost everything that you could find, it looks like the farmers were actually eating less, on average, than the hunter-gatherers that came before them.

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Demsas: After the break: how the history of agriculture is actually a story about low construction costs.

[Break]

Demsas: So it’s in this backdrop that your research kind of comes in, right? People are assuming that it has to be a forced choice, because it’s obviously worse to have been a farmer than to be a hunter-gatherer.

But you have a paper that, I think, really explores and lays out a different way of thinking about things. Before you get into the meat of it, can you tell me about the genesis for the idea? What got you looking at seasonality as a predictor of the Neolithic Revolution?

Matranga: Absolutely. This is a little bit like that scene in Forrest Gump where he starts running, and he says, Well, I thought I’d run until the end of the street, and then I got to the end of the street, so I thought I’d just run into town. And 10 years later, he’s still running.

So the origin of this was that I visited my mom, and my mom was teaching Italian, as it was, at the University of Isfahan in Iran. And we went to see this ziggurat in Chogha Zanbil, which is one of those step pyramids. And I was trying to take a picture of this pyramid, and it was very hard to get a good contrast between the pyramid and the ground. And then what happened was I realized, Oh, of course, it’s hard because it’s made out of mud bricks. It’s made out of literally the same stuff that it’s sitting on. They compress it into bricks and dry them and then stack them, and that’s the pyramid.

And so then I was thinking, Well, why would agriculture originate from an area with very low construction costs? And so the idea was, Well, the reason why you would need low construction costs is because, once you farm, you’re going to get all of your food in one room at one point of the year after the harvest.

Demsas: And sorry—you’re saying that it was already established that farming had begun in places with low construction costs, or you came across this idea yourself?

Matranga: No. So the typical idea is: It starts here because it’s the Fertile Crescent, and it’s so fertile. And the problem with this theory is that the Fertile Crescent is very fertile if you compare it to, you know, the deserts north and south of it. But it’s not very fertile compared to any other place in the world. So it’s not very different in terms of the types of soil and the rainfall patterns than any other place, for example, on the north coast of the Mediterranean.

So the idea was: That’s why it started. That’s why it’s called the Fertile Crescent. And then I realized, Well, isn’t it weird that it happens to also be the place in the world with the lowest construction costs? Because it’s on an alluvial plain, so everything is clay that you can make mud bricks out of. And it doesn’t rain, so that means that it’s not gonna erode it, so you don’t have to bake the bricks, which takes a lot of energy. You just need to sun dry them, stack them, and that’s your building.

Then the idea was, Well, why would it be connected that you start agriculture, or at least it blossoms, in a place that has low construction cost? And I thought, One possibility is that they needed to defend their grain stores. So once you’ve harvested all this food, you’ve put it all in a room. Well, now that’s very attractive to any would-be thieves that would like to come and perhaps kill you and steal it. And that was my undergraduate thesis.

Then fast-forward a couple of years, and I’m doing a master’s, which later morphed into my Ph.D. at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. And I take this course with Hans-Joachim Voth, who later became my advisor, and it’s an Economic History course. And I tell him about what my undergraduate thesis was. And he tells me, It’s interesting, this idea of storage, because there’s this literature that says that hunter-gatherers were actually better off than farmers. And so it could be that maybe you can do some model where there’s some shocks from year to year, and having the granary helps you smooth out the consumption. And so the granary is also important for this reason. See what you can do with it. And I wrote a little paper for the course, and that was that.

From there, then the question was if this is just proof of concept that one of the advantages, that it could be when you start farming, is that you’re able to smooth your consumption. And so that’s why you accept a lower average standard of living, but you don’t get killed by famines when they happen every 10 years or so.

Demsas: It’s like insurance. You, as a human, are like, Okay, I’ll accept less food now, but I know I won’t starve in some forthcoming year.

Matranga: Exactly. And at that point, the story was still about variation from year to year, so I’m worried about famines. And a while after that, I came upon this paper by a French anthropologist called Alain Testart, and what this paper was about—it wasn’t really about farming. It was more about hunter-gatherers that become sedentary. And this happens.

Usually, we associate hunting and gathering with being nomadic, because you’re chasing the game around, or you’re moving up and down the mountains, depending on the seasons. And he said this isn’t really always the case. There’s many cases around the world of hunter-gatherers who are sedentary and have remained sedentary for centuries and millennia without progressing to agriculture.

And a classical example of this are the Native American cultures of the Pacific Northwest. And so there they exploited the salmon run. And so there’s all these millions and millions of salmons that want to reach their breeding grounds in the upland streams. And to do that, they have to pass through these rivers. And the Native Americans, they had these elaborate traps with which they capture the sustainably large, but sustainable—obviously, they wanted to let some through so that they’d reproduce a number of salmon. They’d skin them, and they’d smoke them, and they’d dry them. And that way, they had stores of food that would last them until the next salmon run, which is in the fall.

And he said, If you look at these groups, they have very hierarchical societies. They have elaborate material cultures. And so they had almost everything that we would associate with a farming community except the farming itself. Of course, the reason why they didn’t develop farming was because—it’s important, you know. The salmon is just a salmon. It’s gonna lay the eggs where it wants, and then it’s gonna go into the sea and live in the North Pacific for a few years, and then it’s gonna come back. That was an example of nomads which became sedentary and remain sedentary for hundreds and thousands of years without having farming.

And he said, And what’s crucial is that there’s food which is abundant and seasonal. And that was, like, my aha moment, because we take this story about sedentary hunter-gatherers, and then we could say, Maybe this is the stepping stone between being a nomadic hunter-gatherer and being a sedentary farmer. Because there’s this chicken-and-egg problem. Because if you’re always moving around, then how can you learn how to farm? And instead, if you don’t know how to farm, then why would you become sedentary? Because all the food is moving away. The game is moving away. You’re exhausting your local area, the plants. Why wouldn’t you just move to some other place where there’s more food?

Demsas: And you’d need multiple seasons to figure out how to farm appropriately for your region.

Matranga: Exactly. And so the idea was, by taking this Testart paper, I could say they would become sedentary first because they want to store food. And once they are sedentary and they’re storing food, then they’re preadapted for discovering agriculture, because storing food and being sedentary are two things you need to know how to do if you’re going to be a farmer. So at least you figured out that part of it before. And you do this because you’re trying to avoid seasonality, as Testart said. And this is when I switched from, instead of the problem being a famine every 15 years or whatever, then the problem is this periodic, predictable famine, which happens every year, which we call winter.

And so in order to avoid all starving in winter, we can just sit in one place, gather all these abundant foods in the places where these exist, store them, and then we can process them and eat them as we go along throughout the year, and then the next year we can do the whole thing again. And it was funny because I found this paper—it was a friend of mine’s birthday, and I had to call her and tell her, I’m sorry, but I can’t come, because I found the paper that sort of unlocks everything for me. And I’m just too excited about it, and I wouldn’t be much company.

Demsas: Did she forgive you?

Matranga: Yes. I mean, she already knew. It was baked into the pie. You know, we’d known each other a while.

And so that’s when he moved from, you know, once-in-a-while famine to predictable scarcity, which is seasonality. And from there, then my next step was, why would it be in—because one of the things that’s been observed is that the Neolithic Revolution happens right after the end of the Ice Age. And so the traditional interpretation by a bunch of people was: The Ice Age ends. Before, it’s just too cold to farm in the Middle East, and so nobody was farming there. And then when the Ice Age ends, then there’s the right climate for farming. And then you can farm.

And there’s two issues here, I think. And one of them was that if the climate is really good for farming, then it could also be really good for hunting and gathering. There might also be more wild animals. There might also be more wild plants. So it’s not entirely clear to me that a better climate automatically makes things better for farming. So that would be my first point.

And the second point is that if all you needed was a warm climate, then why couldn’t you farm during the Ice Age but, like, a thousand miles south of where you farmed when the Ice Age ended? Because it’s not like it was a snowball Earth. If you went to the equator, you know, it was still warm. And so my idea was: What was missing during the Ice Age were locations that were really good in summer but really bad in winter, because the issue with the equator isn’t that it’s too warm. The problem is that it’s warm the whole year-round—

Demsas: Yeah, so you would never start farming.

Matranga: —and therefore you don’t need to store. And the important thing is you never become sedentary in order to store, which then leads you to not starting to farm. What happens when the Ice Age ends? Now, there’s places that first it was, let’s say, –20 [degrees] in the winter and –5 in the summer. So there is seasonality, but all of the seasonality is below freezing. So it doesn’t really matter. It’s just a frozen hellscape year-round.

Well, now, if you think that moves, you know, sort of parallel, both the summer and the winter become warmer. Now you’re going to have a winter which is like –5, which is really bad. But now in the summer, let’s say it’s plus-15. Sorry—this is Celsius. I should have prefaced that. And so, basically, what happens is that now the summer is quite good, while the winter is abysmal.

And the question is: How can we exploit these very good summer conditions without getting stuck here in the winter, or without all dying in the winter? And of course, if you’re a stork, then that’s really not a problem, right? You can fly. You can go to this really warm place in the summer, have your nest there, and then in the winter, you just go back to Africa, and that’s perfect. But if you’re humans, and you’re carrying kids with you, then obviously that’s not going to work.

And so you cannot migrate your way out of a Northern Hemisphere winter. So their solution was to store food. And so they say, We can move to these places first. During the summer, we gather all the food, and then we can store it and consume it throughout the long winter. And then the next summer, we do that again. And that was sort of, like, my first idea of why it happens right after the end of the Ice Age.

Demsas: Okay, so the theory is, basically: The Ice Age ends. There’s more seasonality, meaning that the difference between summer and winter increases, so you have these kind of highly variable seasons that we’re used to now. Then people are then incentivized to store, so that they can store food for the winter. And as they’re remaining stable, they discover farming in order to supplement their diets.

Matranga: Exactly. And so the basic idea is: Once you’re sedentary, then, you know, for sure, like—I mean, what is farming? Farming is you’re expending labor in order to increase the amount of food that the land produces. So farming is really on a spectrum. Because a very simple thing you could do is chase away grazing animals so that they don’t eat the fields that you’re going to need in order to get the seed from it during the harvest season. And so that’s, in a sense, farming because you’re expending labor just chasing away the animals, and perhaps then you fence them. And then the next thing you could do is say, Well, last year, a lot of this area was flooded. So I’m going to dig a drainage ditch. And this way, when it rains, you don’t have standing water. The crops don’t rot. And we’re going to have more food the next harvest season. And then you can start doing all of these little things, which, put together, then amount to farming.

But I’ll just go back for a second to the seasonality issue, because what I later found out was that, actually, according to this theory by Serbian physicist called Milanković, it’s actually increases in seasonality which make the Ice Age end. And so what happens is that Earth’s axis is tilted—and famously, this is what causes the seasons—but sometimes it’s more tilted, and sometimes it’s less tilted. And there’s also other variations in Earth’s orbital parameters, and these influence the amount of seasonality that you have in the Northern Hemisphere and in the Southern Hemisphere. And so it’s not really that it was just the end of the Ice Age which caused seasonality to increase, but really there was this big increase in seasonality, which caused the Ice Age to end and also caused the start of agriculture.

Demsas: I would expect that there would have been farming that could come in and out of vogue. I’m curious why we don’t see that in your findings.

Matranga: I completely think that farming probably happened on some hillside 70,000 years ago and on some other hillside 30,000 years ago and some other place 15,000 years ago. And, you know, what I find really interesting and important about farming isn’t so much the fact that they did it once. It’s the fact that it’s a model which is able of spreading.

If it was just something that happened once on one hillside and then stayed there—or perhaps, you know, like the salmon run in the Pacific Northwest—that’s a fantastic accomplishment by the population that does it, but it doesn’t transform the world. Because you cannot take those salmon, bring them to a river in Iowa, and then, you know, just replicate your community in some other place. What’s special about farming is that it does sort of spread, and that it does eventually occupy most of the landmass of the world. And so it’s sort of what I call a franchisable model. It’s not just something that works in one place. You can copy-paste it all over the place.

And so I think it probably happened on some hill, but that’s not super interesting. It would be super interesting, of course, from an anthropological aspect, to find that one hillside where it happened 30,000 years ago. But that didn’t change the history of the world, clearly.

I think, in order to have that, you have to have a wide area in which there’s a lot of seasonality so that when somebody invents, first, you know, storage and sedentarism and then agriculture, then they’re able to take this packet of seeds, bring it to another place, give it to their kids. Their kids can found a colony. Perhaps they displace the local population. Perhaps they intermarry with it, perhaps not a lot of people. You know, I’m sure all three happened in different places at different times. And then their kids can do it in another place, and so you can colonize other places with this technology, or other people can copy this technology and do it in other places. And in order to have this, I think you need both the seasonality but, also, it needs to be on a wide enough area that it’s instantly appealing to everybody because they think, This is just what we’ve been waiting for, a chance to not all starve every February.

Demsas: Hopefully you can unpack why it was such a dominant strategy, right? Because you write in your paper, “Our ancestors traded a risky but abundant lifestyle for a more stable but less prosperous one, driven by risk aversion, particularly among populations near subsistence levels.” And I would imagine that you would expect to see variation based on different populations’ risk tolerance and also desire to kind of smooth their consumption. And also, it seems like there’d be a real free rider problem. Like, nomads could just go around just attacking sedentary populations, taking their food, and moving on. So it’s interesting to me that it ended up being such a dominant strategy to stay put.

Matranga: Yeah, so in terms of, obviously, the risk of raids, I think that would go back to my undergraduate thesis of sort of the importance of having some way of defending. So the first places that do this are actually, like, these hillsides—Jarmo, for example, was an early one—that are very steep on all sides. And, you know, the point is that with that, you kind of need a very specific land conformation, where it’s just the right shape of a hill, and there’s water, and there’s fields close to it, and there’s a way to get from the fields to the hill. And, you know, how many hillsides like that can you find? So the convenient thing is: Once you invent fortifications, then you can build a wall, and so build your own quote-unquote hill in the middle of the fertile plain, which is what they do with sort of Mesopotamia.

So that’s one aspect to it. The other one is that some people remain nomadic for a very long time, usually because either it’s too cold, the growing season is too short, or otherwise the rainfall is too low, and so they’re not able to farm, and the only way that they can survive in a viable number of people is by constantly moving around. But what they usually do, at that point, is they become pastoralists.

One way of seeing this is that it’s not just a matter of risk aversion, because in the end, if your risk aversion, high or low that it is—let’s say that you’re a complete nervous Nellie. You don’t want to take any risk, and you just eat grubs from under a stone, because you never want to leave your immediate area. Well, you’re probably not going to reproduce very fast, which means that either some neighbors that accepted a little bit more risk and have much higher average amount of food have more kids than you, and they can displace you, or even if you somehow intermarry with them, probably they’re not gonna accept your viewpoint on risk aversion. So the risk aversion, in the end, is something which leads you to make some choices, and these choices have some effects on the viability of your group.

Demsas: Yeah. I feel like the fertility question is really interesting here because it’s both that once you begin farming, you have to send your kids out to go farm themselves, but it increases the number of children that are born, too, that survive?

Matranga: I would say both. When you’re walking, when you’re nomadic, in principle, you cannot have more than one kid per parent, because somebody has to carry them, at least when they are, you know, below 6—because 6-year-olds can walk, but they can’t walk as fast as grown-ups.

The second aspect of this is that there’s so many diseases where if you could just stay in a place that’s warm for a couple of weeks, the kid would be fine. But if you’re in the middle of your migration, that’s it.

And the other thing is that when you’re constantly breastfeeding and moving around, you’re probably not gonna put on a lot of weight. And it would appear that a lot of hunter-gatherer women would take a few years to even be fertile again. Because they just would not achieve that—I forget if it’s 15 or 18 percent or—whatever the number is of body fat where your body can even conceive.

So absolutely, when you become sedentary, you can have more kids. And I think even if you want to remain nomadic, if there’s these farmers which are having way more kids than you survive, then if there’s ever any conflict—maybe now, maybe in two centuries—then very likely, the farmers are going to get their way.

Demsas: I’m curious about us returning to what you started this conversation with, which is the question about whether or not it was a good idea for us to move out of the hunter-gatherer stage to the farming stage. Because your paper has something to say, also, about whether we’re over-reading the evidence about humans being worse off nutritionally when they become farmers. So what’s your pushback on this question about, Maybe nutrition was actually improved once you become a farmer?

Matranga: Yes, absolutely. It’s interesting because the first concrete evidence of anything that I found in support of my thesis was what I’m about to tell you. And it’s something called “Harris lines.” So Harris was a pathologist. I believe that one of his kids had a pretty severe disease. For some reason, he saw an X-ray of his kid, and he noticed that he had this line in their bones, sort of a transverse line. So, you know, like, not in the direction of the bone—kind of like a tree ring along the growth.

And so then he explored this more, and he found out that when there is an episode of growth arrest of a child that is growing normally, then—for example, this could be a disease, or it could be that you’re not eating—and so there’s what’s called a “metabolic insult.” Your metabolism is not producing enough energy to both keep you alive while growing, and so then you have growth arrest.

And then when you start eating well again, or the disease passes, then there’s something called catch-up growth. So the body actually grows faster, because it’s trying to get back on the growth curve that it was on originally. And as it’s growing faster, it deposits this different kind of bone, which you can see from X-rays. And so it’s a little bit like a tree ring, but for mammals.

And the interesting thing is that from that same Cohen and Armelagos 1984 book, Paleopathology at the Origins of Agriculture, it also looks like the hunter-gatherers had—they were taller, up to 10 centimeters taller, but they also had—way more of these Harris lines, or growth-arrest lines, in their bones, sometimes as many as six per individual, on average, in some populations. And they also appeared to be evenly spaced, just like tree rings. And so to them, this suggested that almost every year, there would be a period of famine.

And so it really looks like it was this insurance trade-off that you mentioned before, which is that, you know: The hunter-gatherers, they ate a lot, but for a few months, at least, every year, it looks like they were starving, while the farmers, they ate less, on average, but they always ate. They were able to smooth their consumption from summer to winter, logically.

And I think that one of the reasons this had not been proposed before was because as sedentary people with bank accounts and granaries, you know, usually our problems are not about, like, I’m eating a lot this week, but what am I going to eat next week? But if you are a nomad, and you’re not able to store food, then that, I think, would be the dominant concern, and I think that’s why we accepted this trade-off. Like, Sure, we’re just going to be shorter. That’s fine. But, you know, at least we don’t starve for a couple of months every year.

Demsas: So you think this is the correct trade-off? You don’t buy the thesis that we made a mistake?

Matranga: No, no. I think we did a great trade-off. In fact, I think that part of the problem with, even, development goals—they tend to be phrased in terms of averages. We would like people to make, at least, $5 or $10 a day, on average, throughout the year. And then how can we get them to invest? Or how can we take them to become entrepreneurial and so on? But when you’re this close to starvation, I think that the average, obviously, you think about it, as well. But what you’re really worried about is, What am I going to eat in the worst possible case that could happen to me within the next 30 years?

Because the way that they survived as a population through the centuries was by taking the worst case into possibility. If I take a statistic of a country, and I measure their income every year, and for 25 years, it’s quite good, and then they all die in the 26th year, the average income is still very good, but that’s a complete disaster for the population involved.

And so if anything, I think that our way of measuring success is, again, predicated on the fact that we do have insurance, and we do have bank accounts, and we do have granaries. And so our worries are more about averages, while if you are a hunter-gatherer, your life is dominated by the worst outcome. And I think it was a correct choice. In fact, it was so correct that we forgot how awful it is to be eating a whole wildebeest that you killed and still be worried about what you’re going to eat next week.

Demsas: Well, Andrea, always our final question: What is something that you thought was a good idea at the time but ended up only being good on paper?

Matranga: As a personal anecdote, I’d spent a lot of time figuring out a good way to move to the U.S. And I loved my time in the U.S., but then I realized that moving continents is very difficult when you still have family back home. And the things that you like and that you think you’re going to enjoy when you’re 25 and don’t have kids, then once you have a family, you have to move backwards and forwards and all the summer stuff, then it starts to wear on you.

So I just realized, after being incredibly internationally minded, I still love traveling and visiting places, but I became much more homeward bound in my aspirations as time went by.

Demsas: Yeah. Well, Andrea, thank you so much for coming on the show.

Matranga: Absolutely. My absolute pleasure. Anytime.

[Music]

Demsas: Good on Paper is produced by Jinae West. It was edited by Dave Shaw, fact-checked by Ena Alvarado, and engineered by Erica Huang. Our theme music is composed by Rob Smierciak. Claudine Ebeid is the executive producer of Atlantic audio. Andrea Valdez is our managing editor.

And hey, if you like what you’re hearing, please leave us a rating and review on Apple Podcasts.

I’m Jerusalem Demsas, and we’ll see you next week.

[Music]

Matranga: So it was funny, because if you had asked me, What would you say is good on paper? And I was ready to say, Well, for all my office and copier paper needs, I use Dunder Mifflin, the paper supplier. But the setup—

Demsas: The setup was too different? You were going to go with Dunder Mifflin? That’s so funny.

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Lack of fluoride, dentists leaves rural America at risk

Two recent polls have found that the largest share of Americans support fluoridation, but a sizable minority does not. Utah just became the first state to ban it.

In the wooded highlands of northern Arkansas, where small towns have few dentists, water officials who serve more than 20,000 people have for more than a decade openly defied state law by refusing to add fluoride to the drinking water.For its refusal, the Ozark Mountain Regional Public Water Authority has received hundreds of state fines amounting to about $130,000, which are stuffed in a cardboard box and left unpaid, said Andy Anderson, who is opposed to fluoridation and has led the water system for nearly two decades. This Ozark region is among hundreds of rural American communities that face a one-two punch to oral health: a dire shortage of dentists and a lack of fluoridated drinking water, which is widely viewed among dentists as one of the most effective tools to prevent tooth decay. But as the anti-fluoride movement builds unprecedented momentum, it may turn out that the Ozarks were not behind the times after all.“We will eventually win,” Anderson said. “We will be vindicated.”Fluoride, a naturally occurring mineral, keeps teeth strong when added to drinking water, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the American Dental Association. But the anti-fluoride movement has been energized since a government report last summer found a possible link between lower IQ in children and consuming amounts of fluoride that are higher than what is recommended in American drinking water. asaDozens of communities have decided to stop fluoridating in recent months, and state officials in Florida and Texas have urged their water systems to do the same. Last week, Utah became the first state to ban it in tap water.Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr., who has long espoused fringe health theories, has called fluoride an “industrial waste” and “dangerous neurotoxin” and said the Trump administration will recommend it be removed from all public drinking water.Separately, Republican efforts to extend tax cuts and shrink federal spending may squeeze Medicaid, which could deepen existing shortages of dentists in rural areas where many residents depend on the federal insurance program for whatever dental care they can find.Dental experts warn that the simultaneous erosion of Medicaid and fluoridation could exacerbate a crisis of rural oral health and reverse decades of progress against tooth decay, particularly for children and those who rarely see a dentist.“If you have folks with little access to professional care and no access to water fluoridation,” said Steven Levy, a dentist and leading fluoride researcher at the University of Iowa, “then they are missing two of the big pillars of how to keep healthy for a lifetime.”Many already are.James Flanagin, the only dentist in the tiny Arkansas town of Leslie, treats patients in the back of an antique store and, with hand-painted lettering, advertises his clinic and himself as a “pretty good dentist.” (Katie Adkins for KFF Health News)Katie AdkinsOverlapping ‘dental deserts’ and fluoride-free zonesNearly 25 million Americans live in areas without enough dentists — more than twice as many as prior estimates by the federal government — according to a recent study from Harvard University that measured U.S. “dental deserts” with more depth and precision than before.Hawazin Elani, a Harvard dentist and epidemiologist who co-authored the study, found that many shortage areas are rural and poor, and depend heavily on Medicaid. But many dentists do not accept Medicaid because payments can be low, Elani said.The ADA has estimated that only a third of dentists treat patients on Medicaid.“I suspect this situation is much worse for Medicaid beneficiaries,” Elani said. “If you have Medicaid and your nearest dentists do not accept it, then you will likely have to go to the third, or fourth, or the fifth.”The Harvard study identified over 780 counties where more than half of the residents live in a shortage area. Of those counties, at least 230 also have mostly or completely unfluoridated public drinking water, according to a KFF analysis of fluoride data published by the CDC. That means people in these areas who can’t find a dentist also do not get protection for their teeth from their tap water.A Flourish data visualizationThe KFF Health News analysis does not cover the entire nation because it does not include private wells and 13 states do not submit fluoride data to the CDC. But among those that do, most counties with a shortage of dentists and unfluoridated water are in the south-central U.S., in a cluster that stretches from Texas to the Florida Panhandle and up into Kansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma.In the center of that cluster is the Ozark Mountain Regional Public Water Authority, which serves the Arkansas counties of Boone, Marion, Newton, and Searcy. It has refused to add fluoride ever since Arkansas enacted a statewide mandate in 2011. After weekly fines began in 2016, the water system unsuccessfully challenged the fluoride mandate in state court, then lost again on appeal.Anderson, who has chaired the water system’s board since 2007, said he would like to challenge the fluoride mandate in court again and would argue the case himself if necessary. In a phone interview, Anderson said he believes that fluoride can hamper the brain and body to the point of making people “get fat and lazy.”“So if you go out in the streets these days, walk down the streets, you’ll see lots of fat people wearing their pajamas out in public,” he said.Nearby in the tiny, no-stoplight community of Leslie, Arkansas, which gets water from the Ozark system, the only dentist in town operates out of a one-man clinic tucked in the back of an antique store. Hand-painted lettering on the store window advertises a “pretty good dentist.”James Flanagin, a third-generation dentist who opened this clinic three years ago, said he was drawn to Leslie by the quaint charms and friendly smiles of small-town life. But those same smiles also reveal the unmistakable consequences of refusing to fluoridate, he said.“There is no doubt that there is more dental decay here than there would otherwise be,” he said. “You are going to have more decay if your water is not fluoridated. That’s just a fact.”Flanagin, the only dentist in the tiny Ozark town of Leslie, Arkansas, runs his clinic in the back of an antique store. He says the town suffers from high levels of tooth decay because the local drinking water is not fluoridated.(Katie Adkins for KFF Health News)Fluoride seen as a great public health achievementFluoride was first added to public water in an American city in 1945 and spread to half of the U.S. population by 1980, according to the CDC. Because of “the dramatic decline” in cavities that followed, in 1999 the CDC dubbed fluoridation as one of 10 great public health achievements of the 20th century.Currently more than 70% of the U.S. population on public water systems get fluoridated water, with a recommended concentration of 0.7 milligrams per liter, or about three drops in a 55-gallon barrel, according to the CDC.Fluoride is also present in modern toothpaste, mouthwash, dental varnish, and some food and drinks — like raisins, potatoes, oatmeal, coffee, and black tea. But several dental experts said these products do not reliably reach as many low-income families as drinking water, which has an additional benefit over toothpaste of strengthening children’s teeth from within as they grow.Two recent polls have found that the largest share of Americans support fluoridation, but a sizable minority does not. Polls from Axios/Ipsos and AP-NORC found that 48% and 40% of respondents wanted to keep fluoride in public water supplies, while 29% and 26% supported its removal.Chelsea Fosse, an expert on oral health policy at the American Academy of Pediatric Dentistry, said she worried that misguided fears of fluoride would cause many people to stop using fluoridated toothpaste and varnish just as Medicaid cuts made it harder to see a dentist.The combination, she said, could be “devastating.”“It will be visibly apparent what this does to the prevalence of tooth decay,” Fosse said. “If we get rid of water fluoridation, if we make Medicaid cuts, and if we don’t support providers in locating and serving the highest-need populations, I truly don’t know what we will do.”Multiple peer-reviewed studies have shown what ending water fluoridation could look like. In the past few years, studies of cities in Alaska and Canada have shown that communities that stopped fluoridation saw significant increases in children’s cavities when compared with similar cities that did not. A 2024 study from Israel reported a “two-fold increase” in dental treatments for kids within five years after the country stopped fluoridating in 2014.Despite the benefits of fluoridation, it has been fiercely opposed by some since its inception, said Catherine Hayes, a Harvard dental expert who advises the American Dental Association on fluoride and has studied its use for three decades.Fluoridation was initially smeared as a communist plot against America, Hayes said, and then later fears arose of possible links to cancer, which were refuted through extensive scientific research. In the ‘80s, hysteria fueled fears of fluoride causing AIDS, which was “ludicrous,” Hayes said.More recently, the anti-fluoride movement seized on international research that suggests high levels of fluoride can hinder children’s brain development and has been boosted by high-profile legal and political victories.Last August, a hotly debated report from the National Institutes of Health’s National Toxicology Program found “with moderate confidence” that exposure to levels of fluoride that are higher than what is present in American drinking water is associated with lower IQ in children. The report was based on an analysis of 74 studies conducted in other countries, most of which were considered “low quality” and involved exposure of at least 1.5 milligrams of fluoride per liter of water — or more than twice the U.S. recommendation — according to the program.The following month, in a long-simmering lawsuit filed by fluoride opponents, a federal judge in California said the possible link between fluoride and lowered IQ was too risky to ignore, then ordered the federal Environmental Protection Agency to take nonspecified steps to lower that risk. The EPA started to appeal this ruling in the final days of the Biden administration, but the Trump administration could reverse course.The EPA and Department of Justice declined to comment. The White House and Department of Health and Human Services did not respond to questions about fluoride.Despite the National Toxicology Program’s report, Hayes said, no association has been shown to date between lowered IQ and the amount of fluoride actually present in most Americans’ water. The court ruling may prompt additional research conducted in the U.S., Hayes said, which she hoped would finally put the campaign against fluoride to rest.“It’s one of the great mysteries of my career, what sustains it,” Hayes said. “What concerns me is that there’s some belief amongst some members of the public — and some of our policymakers — that there is some truth to this.”Not all experts were so dismissive of the toxicology program’s report. Bruce Lanphear, a children’s health researcher at Simon Fraser University in British Columbia, published an editorial in January that said the findings should prompt health organizations “to reassess the risks and benefits of fluoride, particularly for pregnant women and infants.”“The people who are proposing fluoridation need to now prove it’s safe,” Lanphear told NPR in January. “That’s what this study does. It shifts the burden of proof — or it should.”Cities and states rethink fluorideAt least 14 states so far this year have considered or are considering bills that would lift fluoride mandates or prohibit fluoride in drinking water altogether. In February, Utah lawmakers passed the nation’s first ban, which Republican Gov. Spencer Cox told ABC4 Utah he intends to sign. And both Florida Surgeon General Joseph Ladapo and Texas Agriculture Commissioner Sid Miller have called for their respective states to end fluoridation.“I don’t want Big Brother telling me what to do,” Miller told The Dallas Morning News in February. “Government has forced this on us for too long.”Additionally, dozens of cities and counties have decided to stop fluoridation in the past six months — including at least 16 communities in Florida with a combined population of more than 1.6 million — according to news reports and the Fluoride Action Network, an anti-fluoride group.Stuart Cooper, executive director of that group, said the movement’s unprecedented momentum would be further supercharged if Kennedy and the Trump administration follow through on a recommendation against fluoride.Cooper predicted that most U.S. communities will have stopped fluoridating within years.“I think what you are seeing in Florida, where every community is falling like dominoes, is going to now happen in the United States,” he said. “I think we’re seeing the absolute end of it.”If Cooper’s prediction is right, Hayes said, widespread decay would be visible within years. Kids’ teeth will rot in their mouths, she said, even though “we know how to completely prevent it.”“It’s unnecessary pain and suffering,” Hayes said. “If you go into any children’s hospital across this country, you’ll see a waiting list of kids to get into the operating room to get their teeth fixed because they have severe decay because they haven’t had access to either fluoridated water or other types of fluoride. Unfortunately, that’s just going to get worse.”Methodology: How We CountedThis KFF Health News article identifies communities with an elevated risk of tooth decay by combining data on areas with dentist shortages and unfluoridated drinking water. Our analysis merged Harvard University research on dentist-shortage areas with large datasets on public water systems published by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.The Harvard research determined that nearly 25 million Americans live in dentist-shortage areas that span much of rural America. The CDC data details the populations served and fluoridation status of more than 38,000 public water systems in 37 states. We classified counties as having elevated risk of tooth decay if they met three criteria:--More than half of the residents live in a dentist-shortage area identified by Harvard.--The number of people receiving unfluoridated water from water systems based in that county amounts to more than half of the county’s population.--The number of people receiving unfluoridated water from water systems based in that county amounts to at least half of the total population of all water systems based in that county, even if those systems reached beyond the county borders, which many do.Our analysis identified approximately 230 counties that meet these criteria, meaning they have both a dire shortage of dentists and largely unfluoridated drinking water.But this total is certainly an undercount. Thirteen states do not report water system data to the CDC, and the agency data does not include private wells, most of which are unfluoridated.KFF Health News data editor Holly K. Hacker contributed to this article.

World's Glaciers Are Losing Record Ice as Global Temperatures Climb, U.N. Says

By Alexander Villegas(Reuters) - Glaciers around the globe are disappearing faster than ever, with the last three-year period seeing the largest...

(Reuters) - Glaciers around the globe are disappearing faster than ever, with the last three-year period seeing the largest glacial mass loss on record, according to a UNESCO report released on Friday. The 9,000 gigatons of ice lost from glaciers since 1975 are roughly equivalent to "an ice block the size of Germany with the thickness of 25 meters," Michael Zemp, director of the Switzerland-based World Glacier Monitoring Service, said during a press conference announcing the report at the UN headquarters in Geneva.The dramatic ice loss, from the Arctic to the Alps, from South America to the Tibetan Plateau, is expected to accelerate as climate change, caused by the burning of fossil fuels, pushes global temperatures higher. This would likely exacerbate economic, environmental and social problems across the world as sea levels rise and these key water sources dwindle.  The report coincides with a UNESCO summit in Paris marking the first World Day for Glaciers, urging global action to protect glaciers around the world.Zemp said that five of the last six years registered the largest losses, with glaciers losing 450 gigatons of mass in 2024 alone.The accelerated loss has made mountain glaciers one of the largest contributors to sea level rise, putting millions at risk of devastating floods and damaging water routes that billions of people depend on for hydroelectric energy and agriculture.Stefan Uhlenbrook, the director of water and cryosphere at the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), said that about 275,000 glaciers remain globally which, along with the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets, comprise about 70% of the world's freshwater."We need to advance our scientific knowledge, we need to advance through better observing systems, through better forecasts and better early warning systems for the planet and the people," Uhlenbrook said.About 1.1 billion people live in mountain communities, which suffer the most immediate impacts of glacier loss, due to the increasing risks with natural hazards and unreliable water sources. The remote locations and difficult terrains also make cheap fixes difficult to come by.Rising temperatures are expected to worsen droughts in areas that rely on snowpack for freshwater, while increasing both the severity and frequency of hazards like avalanches, landslides, flash floods and glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs).One Peruvian farmer living downstream of a retreating glacier has taken the issue to court, suing German energy giant RWE for a portion of the glacial lake's flood defenses proportionate to its historic global emissions."The changes we see in the field are literally heartbreaking," glaciologist Heidi Sevestre, secretariat at the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program, told Reuters outside the UNESCO headquarters in Paris on Wednesday.    "Things in certain regions are happening actually much faster than we anticipated," Sevestre added, noting a recent trip to the Rwenzori Mountains, located in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in East Africa, where glaciers are now expected to disappear by 2030.Sevestre has worked with the region's indigenous Bakonzo communities who believe a deity called Kitasamba lives in the glaciers."Can you imagine the deep spiritual connection, this strong attachment they have towards the glaciers and what it might mean for them that their glaciers are disappearing?" Sevestre said.Glacial melt in East Africa has led to increased local conflicts over water, according to the new UNESCO report, and while the impact on a global scale is minimal, the trickle of melting glaciers around the world is having a compounding impact.    Between 2000 and 2023, melting mountain glaciers have caused 18 millimeters of global sea level rise, about 1 mm per year. Every millimeter can expose up to 300,000 people to annual flooding, according to the World Glacier Monitoring Service. "Billions of people are connected to glaciers, whether they know it or not, and that will require billions of people to protect them," Sevestre said.(Reporting by Alexander Villegas; Editing by Gloria Dickie and Aurora Ellis)Copyright 2025 Thomson Reuters.Photos You Should See - Feb. 2025

Controversy erupts over claims Microsoft invented a new state of matter

This discovery could change the computing world entirely. But many are skeptical of their claims

The matter making up the world around us has long-since been organized into three neat categories: solids, liquids and gases. But last month, Microsoft announced that it had allegedly discovered another state of matter originally theorized to exist in 1937.  This new state of matter called the Majorana zero mode is made up of quasiparticles, which act as their own particle and antiparticle. The idea is that the Majorana zero mode could be used to build a quantum computer, which could help scientists answer complex questions that standard computers are not capable of solving, with implications for medicine, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence. In late February, Sen. Ted Cruz presented Microsoft’s new computer chip at a congressional hearing, saying, “Technologies like this new chip I hold in the palm of my hand, the Majorana 1 quantum chip, are unlocking a new era of computing that will transform industries from health care to energy, solving problems that today's computers simply cannot.” However, Microsoft’s announcement, claiming a “breakthrough in quantum computing,” was met with skepticism from some physicists in the field. Proving that this form of quantum computing can work requires first demonstrating the existence of Majorana quasiparticles, measuring what the Majorana particles are doing, and creating something called a topological qubit used to store quantum information. But some say that not all of the data necessary to prove this has been included in the research paper published in Nature, on which this announcement is based. And due to a fraught history of similar claims from the company being disputed and ultimately rescinded, some are extra wary of the results. Although the paper describes the structure and architecture that could potentially be used to build a topological quantum computer, it’s not clear if all of these ingredients can be put together to actually construct the system, said Dr. Jelena Klinovaj, a theoretical physicist at the University of Basel who studies topology of quantum.  "Discourse and skepticism are all part of the scientific process." “In this Microsoft paper, they cannot show that they can really operate it,” Klinovaj told Salon in a video call. “They did not show in a peer-reviewed publication that it is really a topological state because some objects could have exactly the same properties in experiments.” Despite Microsoft’s announcement, one of the peer-review files accompanying the Nature paper also states, “The editorial team wishes to point out that the results in this manuscript do not represent evidence for the presence of Majorana zero modes in the reported devices.” Dr. Chetan Nayak, Microsoft Station Q Director, said in an email that prior work published in Nature “confirms the existence of [Majorana zero modes] and demonstrates the basic operation needed for a topological qubit.” “Since then, we have fabricated and tested topological qubits, building on this prior work and further confirming the existence of [Majorana zero modes],” Nayak wrote. A Microsoft spokesperson said in an email that the company has made significant progress since the paper was submitted and has been able to demonstrate “the basic native operations in a measurement-based topological qubit.” Want more health and science stories in your inbox? Subscribe to Salon's weekly newsletter Lab Notes. “Discourse and skepticism are all part of the scientific process,” they wrote. “That is why we are dedicated to the continued open publication of our research, so that everyone can build on what others have discovered and learned.” It’s not the first time there has been controversy in this research field. In 2018, a study partially funded by Microsoft but conducted by an independent university reported that they had detected the presence of Majorana zero-modes. Later, it was retracted by Nature, the journal that published it after a report from independent experts put the findings under more intense scrutiny. In the report, four physicists not involved in the research concluded that it did not appear that the authors had intentionally misrepresented the data, but instead seemed to be “caught up in the excitement of the moment.” Establishing the existence of these particles is extremely complex in part because disorder in the device can create signals that mimic these quasiparticles when they are not actually there.  "Me and many other experts do not think they have demonstrated even the basic science behind it." Modern computers in use today are encoded in bits, which can either be in a zero state (no current flowing through them), or a one state (current flowing.) These bits work together to send information and signals that communicate with the computer, powering everything from cell phones to video games. Companies like Google, IBM and Amazon have invested in designing another form of quantum computer that uses chips built with “qubits,” or quantum bits. Qubits can exist in both zero and one states at the same time due to a phenomenon called superposition.  However, qubits are subject to external noise from the environment that can affect their performance, said Dr. Paolo Molignini, a researcher in theoretical quantum physics at Stockholm University. “Because qubits are in a superposition of zero and one, they are very prone to errors and they are very prone to what is called decoherence, which means there could be noise, thermal fluctuations or many things that can collapse the state of the qubits,” Molignini told Salon in a video call. “Then you basically lose all of the information that you were encoding.” It’s necessary to correct errors that creep in with this noise, and in order to do so, you need to add many more qubits to the system. Within the last six months, Amazon announced it had built a computer chip that used five qubits, and Google announced that it had built one with 105 qubits. In December, Google said its quantum computer could perform a calculation that a standard computer could complete in 10 septillion years — a period far longer than the age of the universe — in just under five minutes.  However, a general-purpose computer would require billions of qubits, so these approaches are still a far cry from having practical applications, said Dr. Patrick Lee, a physicist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who co-authored the report leading to the 2018 Nature paper's retraction. Microsoft is taking a different approach to quantum computing by trying to develop  a topological qubit, which has the ability to store information in multiple places at once. Topological qubits exist within the Majorana zero states and are appealing because they can theoretically offer greater protection against environmental noise that destroys information within a quantum system. Think of it like an arrow, where the arrowhead holds a portion of the information and the arrow tail holds the rest, Lee said. Distributing information across space like this is called topological protection. “If you are able to put them far apart from each other, then you have a chance of maintaining the identity of the arrow even if it is subject to noise,” Lee told Salon in a phone interview. “The idea is that if the noise affects the head, it doesn’t kill the arrow and if it affects only the tail it doesn’t kill your arrow. It has to affect both sides simultaneously to kill your arrow, and that is very unlikely if you are able to put them apart.” In a Microsoft press release announcing the Majorana 1, the company says the chip could calculate catalysts that break down plastic pollutants and “lead to self-healing materials that repair cracks in bridges or airplane parts, shattered phone screens or scratched car doors.” “Enzymes, a kind of biological catalyst, could be harnessed more effectively in healthcare and agriculture, thanks to accurate calculations about their behavior that only quantum computing can provide,” it states. “This could lead to breakthroughs helping to eradicate global hunger: boosting soil fertility to increase yields or promoting sustainable growth of foods in harsh climates.” Yet Dr. Sergey Frolov, an associate professor of physics at the University of Pittsburgh whose analysis of the 2018 study data led to its subsequent investigation and retraction, argues that the paper does not demonstrate the existence of a topological qubit which is critical in establishing the quantum computing system they say they are creating. “The long story short is that me and many other experts do not think they have demonstrated even the basic science behind it, let alone the leap into technology of scaling up, production, etc.,” Frolov told Salon in a phone interview.  Nevertheless, Lee believes that even if the data doesn’t entirely prove that topological qubits exist in the Majorana zero-state, it still represents a scientific advancement. But he noted that several important issues need to be solved before it has practical implications. For one, the coherence time of these particles — or how long they can exist without being affected by environmental noise — is still very short, he explained. “They make a measurement, come back, and the qubit has changed, so you have lost your coherence,” Lee said. “With this very short time, you cannot do anything with it.” It could be that some form of engineering is necessary to incrementally improve the coherence of the qubits to solve this problem, Lee said. Or, it could require other major scientific breakthroughs that change the way we think about them, he said.  Nayak said the company plans to present these findings at the American Physical Society’s Global Physics Summit later this month. But it’s yet to be seen if all of the pieces necessary to make this form of quantum computer will come together into something with practical implications. “As far as the press announcement that they have a topological qubit, I would say most scientists would dispute that,” Lee said. “They are far from having a working qubit.” In the meantime, some are concerned that the back and forth on the topic within the field could cast a shadow on future developments in topological quantum computing. “I just wish they were a bit more careful with their claims because I fear that if they don’t measure up to what they are saying, there might be a backlash at some point where people say, ‘You promised us all these fancy things and where are they now?’” Molignini said. “That might damage the entire quantum community, not just themselves.” Read more about technology

Rain gave Australia’s environment a fourth year of reprieve in 2024 – but this masks deepening problems: report

Favourable short-term conditions kept Australia’s environmental scorecard high in 2024 – but long-term problems are worsening.

Lauren Henderson/ShutterstockFor the fourth year running, the condition of Australia’s environment has been relatively good overall. Our national environment scorecard released today gives 2024 a mark of 7.7 out of 10. You might wonder how this can be. After all, climate change is intensifying and threatened species are still in decline. The main reason: good rainfall partly offset the impact of global warming. In many parts of Australia, rainfall, soil water and river flows were well above average, there were fewer large bushfires, and vegetation continued to grow. Overall, conditions were above average in the wetter north and east of Australia, although parts of the south and west were very dry. But this is no cause for complacency. Australia’s environment remains under intense pressure. Favourable conditions have simply offered a welcome but temporary reprieve. As a nation we must grasp the opportunity now to implement lasting solutions before the next cycle of drought and fire comes around. This snapshot shows the environmental score for a range of indicators in Australia. Australia’s Environment Report 2024, CC BY-NC-ND Preparing the national scorecard For the tenth year running, we have trawled through a huge amount of data from satellites, weather and water measuring stations, and ecological surveys. We gathered information about climate change, oceans, people, weather, water, soils, plants, fire and biodiversity. Then we analysed the data and summarised it all in a report that includes an overall score for the environment. This score (between zero and ten) gives a relative measure of how favourable conditions were for nature, agriculture and our way of life over the past year in comparison to all years since 2000. This is the period we have reliable records for. While it is a national report, conditions vary enormously between regions and so we also prepare regional scorecards. You can download the scorecard for your region at our website. Different jurisdictions had quite different environmental scores in 2024. Australia’s Environment Report 2024, CC BY-NC-ND Welcome news, but alarming trends continue Globally, 2024 was the world’s hottest year on record. It was Australia’s second hottest year, with the record warmest sea surface temperatures. As a result, the Great Barrier Reef experienced its fifth mass bleaching event since 2016, while Ningaloo Reef in Western Australia also experienced bleaching. Yet bushfire activity was low despite high temperatures, thanks to regular rainfall. National rainfall was 18% above average, improving soil condition and increasing tree canopy cover. States such as New South Wales saw notable improvements in environmental conditions, while conditions also improved somewhat in Western Australia. Others experienced declines, particularly South Australia, Victoria, and Tasmania. These regional contrasts were largely driven by rainfall – good rains can hide some underlying environmental degradation trends. Favourable weather conditions bumped up the nation’s score this year, rather than sustained environmental improvements. Mapping the environmental condition score to local government areas reveals poor (red) conditions in the west and the south, with good scores (blue) in the east and north. White is neutral. Australia’s Environment Explorer, CC BY-NC-ND A temporary respite? The past four years show Australia’s environment is capable of bouncing back from drought and fire when conditions are right. But the global climate crisis continues to escalate, and Australia remains highly vulnerable. Rising sea levels, more extreme weather and fire events continue to threaten our environment and livelihoods. The consequences of extreme events can persist for many years, like we have seen for the Black Summer of 2019–20. To play our part in limiting global warming, Australia needs to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. Progress is stalling: last year, national emissions fell slightly (0.6%) below 2023 levels but were still higher than in 2022. Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions per person remain among the highest in the world. Biodiversity loss remains an urgent issue. The national threatened species list grew by 41 species in 2024. While this figure is much lower than the record of 130 species added in 2023, it remains well above the long-term average of 25 species added per year. More than half of the newly listed or uplisted species were directly affected by the Black Summer fires. Meanwhile, habitat destruction and invasive species continue to put pressure on native ecosystems and species. The Threatened Species Index captures data from long-term threatened species monitoring. The index is updated annually but with a three-year lag due largely to delays in data processing and sharing. This means the 2024 index includes data up to 2021. The index revealed the abundance of threatened birds, mammals, plants, and frogs has fallen an average of 58% since 2000. But there may be some good news. Between 2020 and 2021, the overall index increased slightly (2%) suggesting the decline has stabilised and some recovery is evident across species groups. We’ll need further monitoring to confirm whether this represents a lasting turnaround or a temporary pause in declines. This graph shows the relative abundance of different categories of species listed as threatened under the EPBC Act since 2000, as collated by the Threatened Species Index. Australia’s Environment Report 2024, CC BY-NC-ND What needs to happen? The 2024 Australia’s Environment Report offers a cautiously optimistic picture of the present. Without intervention, the future will look a lot worse. Australia must act decisively to secure our nation’s environmental future. This includes reducing greenhouse gas emissions, introducing stronger land management policies and increasing conservation efforts to maintain and restore our ecosystems. Without redoubling our efforts, the apparent environmental improvements will not be more than a temporary pause in a long-term downward trend. Australia’s Environment Report is produced by the ANU Fenner School for Environment & Society and the Terrestrial Ecosystem Research Network (TERN), which is enabled by the National Collaborative Research Infrastructure Strategy. Albert Van Dijk receives or has previously received funding from several government-funded agencies, grant schemes and programs. Shoshana Rapley is a Research Assistant and PhD candidate at the Australian National University and has received funding from the Ecological Society of Australia and BirdLife Australia. Tayla Lawrie is a current employee of the Terrestrial Ecosystem Research Network (TERN), funded by the National Collaborative Research Infrastructure Strategy.

California bill would restore wetlands protections in wake of Supreme Court ruling

A Supreme Court ruling placed limits on federal protections for many streams and wetlands. A bill in California's Legislature seeks to restore safeguards.

California lawmakers are proposing legislation that aims to reestablish safeguards for the state’s streams and wetlands in response to a Supreme Court ruling limiting federal clean water regulations. Supporters say the legislation has taken on heightened urgency as the Trump administration begins to scale back protections for many streams and wetlands, making them vulnerable to pollution and worsening water quality. “We need clean water to drink, to grow our food, to safely bathe and swim in, to support healthy ecosystems and the environment,” said state Sen. Ben Allen (D-Santa Monica), who introduced the bill. “It’s about protecting our water supply, and it’s a common-sense measure that simply restores the protections that our waterways have always enjoyed since 1948.”Federal standards have since 1948 limited pollution discharges into waterways. Such standards later became a central part of the federal Clean Water Act, adopted in 1972.In Sackett vs. EPA, the Supreme Court ruled in 2023 that Clean Water Act protections don’t apply to many wetlands and ephemeral streams, which flow when it rains but otherwise sit dry much of the time. The court ruled that the law’s protections for the “waters of the United States” apply only to wetlands and streams that are directly connected to navigable waterways.The decision was supported by groups representing developers and the agriculture industry, who say the EPA had overstepped its authority by restricting private property owners from developing their land.California officials and clean water advocates counter that the rollback of protections will jeopardize vital water sources and ecosystems throughout the arid West.“It should be recognized as not just a threat to water quality but overall quality of life, and frankly, a threat to our state,” said Assemblymember Ash Kalra (D-San José), the bill’s co-author. Kalra said the court ruling has stripped federal protections “from many of our most precious wetlands and streams, each a crucial linkage in a complex water network that undergirds every animal, every plant, every human being in our state.”The bill, SB 601, would restore previous protections for California’s wetlands and streams by requiring permits for pollution discharges from businesses and construction projects. The measure calls for state standards that meet or exceed the regulations previously in place during the Biden administration.“This was a system that was working well,” Allen said. “We’ve got to step up.”The legislation, he said, effectively rolls back the clock prior to the court decision to maintain protections, and “enshrines a new framework into state law.” Under the bill, titled the Right to Clean Water Act, the State Water Resources Control Board would be tasked with implementing and enforcing the rules. A cormorant presides over what’s left of a snorkeling pool in the drying Kern River in Bakersfield. (Gary Kazanjian / For The Times) “It’s critical that our state protects our waterways in the same way that we have over the last 50 years,” said Sean Bothwell, executive of the group California Coastkeeper Alliance, which is supporting the legislation.He called the Supreme Court ruling misguided, saying it was biased toward waterways in the wetter East Coast climate, and doesn’t fit California’s reality, where many streams flow only when it rains.“Our Mediterranean climate doesn’t allow for our rivers and streams, and the creeks that flow into them, to flow permanently,” Bothwell said. “What this bill does is it maintains the protections that Californians have enjoyed.”While the legislation is being discussed in Sacramento, the federal Environmental Protection Agency has begun to revise the so-called Waters of the United States rule to bring regulations into line with the Supreme Court ruling.Announcing plans for the regulatory rollback last week, the EPA said the agency, acting together with the Army Corps of Engineers, will “move quickly to ensure that a revised definition follows the law, reduces red-tape, cuts overall permitting costs, and lowers the cost of doing business.” The EPA said it will begin its review by seeking input from stakeholders.“We want clean water for all Americans supported by clear and consistent rules,” EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin said in the announcement. He said the previous version of the regulations “placed unfair burdens on the American people and drove up the cost of doing business.”The EPA has also announced plans to roll back more than two dozen other regulations, which environmentalists say would severely harm the nation’s progress in addressing air and water pollution.Bothwell said the EPA’s new rule, once adopted, might go beyond the Supreme Court ruling and make it “more sweeping than it already was.”Without the state legislation, he said, the combination of the court decision and the Trump administration’s pullback of regulations will leave seasonal streams and many wetlands without Clean Water Act protections. “We can no longer rely upon the federal government to protect and provide clean and affordable water,” Bothwell said.State officials and environmental advocates have said because about 90% of California’s wetlands have already been drained and destroyed, strong protections for those that remain are vital.Whether protective measures are in place could affect the state’s aquatic ecosystems. There are nearly 4,000 freshwater species in California, and researchers at the Public Policy Institute of California said in a report last year that there are no protections in place for many species that are threatened.“Our waters are connected. Our freshwater ecosystems, groundwater aquifers, rivers, wetlands and other waterways are all interconnected,” said Ashley Overhouse, a water policy advisor for the nonprofit group Defenders of Wildlife.She said when pollution flows into wetlands or streams, the effects on threatened species and water quality can be widespread, harming ecosystems that are also suffering from the effects of climate change.The bill would provide “clarity and efficient protections for the state at a time of regulatory and political uncertainty,” Overhouse said.The ultimate goal, she said, is to ensure “a future where clean, healthy water is guaranteed for all communities and all wildlife.”

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